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ARGUMENT 
Golden Meadows arguments with respect to the Appellants Points I and II 
concerning disqualification requires this Court to look beyond speculation and make 
specific determinations concerning the following issues: 
I JURISDICTION IS PROPER 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This Court has 
jurisdiction to analyze the evidence that has been presented by the Appellants pursuant to 
Ina Marie Johnson v. Neldon Paul Johnson 2004 UT App 13 (Not for Official 
Publication) where this Court held that issues regarding a motion to disqualify may be 
raised in an appeal after entry of an order denying the rule 60(b) motion. See Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct, App. 1989) ("It is well settled under 
Utah law, an order denying relief under [r]ule 60(b) is a final appealable order."). 
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case where the Rule 60(b) Motion was 
filed concurrently with the Rule 63 Motion and, both rely on the same Affidavit by 
Strand [R. 2963], it is proper for the Appellants to raise issues regarding the motion to 
disqualify in the appeal taken from the December 12, 2008 Order denying the Appellants' 
Rule 60(b) Motion. 
II. PREJUDICE IS PRESUMED 
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a case are 
entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. Because this action and Judge Dawson's prior 
representation of the Internal Revenue Service against Strand and his entities in 1989 
involve the same fundamental questions of ownership with respect to the same furniture, 
1 
the same house and the same property (Strand's home and furniture of 32 years), the same 
evidence (the 1985 lease), the same individuals (Petty and Strand) and the same entities 
(Nupetco Associates1 and B.I. Associates2)3, actual prejudice need not be shown since the 
law presumes prejudice in such circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14. 
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 Utah, 1985. [Addendum at 1-4]. 
HI. THE RECENT DECISION IN BANGERTER V. PETTY, 2009 UT 67 
ENSURES THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
Judge Dawson held that the statute of limitations barred Strand in actual 
possession of the real property under a claim of ownership from asserting a quiet title 
action and litigating his defenses. The Summary Judgment ruling entered by Judge 
Dawson at pg. 3 second to last line states: "Absent the Lease, the residence that is the 
subject of this action (the "Property") would still have belonged to Nupetco Associates 
("Nupetco") following the 1985 trustee's sale and therefore could not have been attached 
by Strand's creditors"4. This conclusion is contradicted by the ancient documents 
associated with the 1989 IRS Action including the May 19, 1989 Affidavit by Neuman 
Petty for Nupetco [R. 2987 (lease 2995)] and the Application for Subordination [R. 
1
 A Neuman Petty entity. A party to the 1982 Agreement [R. 650] and the owner and sole 
member and manager of Golden Meadows. 
2
 A d.b.a. of Strands. A party to the 1982 Agreement (the owner of the 3.2 million dollars 
worth of production equipment referred to in R. 650) and, a guarantor of the $390,000 
loan with Citizen's Bank that is at issue in this action [R. 1775 <|[16, 1793, 1794 and 1795 
{See Addendum pgs. 6-8 ), 1838-1839fj['s 5-6] 
3
 [R. 2963] 
4
 [R. 2704] 
2 
2999]. Due process required the Appellants an opportunity to discover and present that 
evidence. 
It was error for Judge Dawson to engage in ex parte contacts with opposing 
counsel concerning the "jurisdiction issue" and "developments" [R. 2250 (09/18/07), 
3715]. It was error for Judge Dawson to deny the Appellants discovery motions and 
further sanction them for seeking information about the Notice to Quit and the 1985 lease 
[R. 1911]. It was error for Judge Dawson to strike Strands rebuttal testimony [R. 2213] 
and further misinterpret and judge the credibility of the stricken averments or parties, or 
witnesses or the weight of the evidence5 [R. 2702]. And, it was error for Judge Dawson 
to fail to comply with Judge Kay's Rule 63(b)(3)(B) request [R. 3034] and judicial bias 
rules which required him to submit an affidavit for the record [R. 3053]. 
It was error for Judge Dawson to preside in this case. Strand's affidavit6 remains 
uncontroverted. It is the only affidavit on the record regarding his Rule 63 Motion and, it 
is supported by ancient documents. Golden Meadows response does not satisfy its burden 
of rebutting Strand's affidavit with similar testimony under oath as neither Neuman 
Petty, Wayne Petty nor Judge Dawson have filed rebuttal affidavits. 
Consistent with the Appellants Opening Brief at pages 30 through 33, the 
Appellants respectfully request this court to interpret the four corners of the Notice to 
Quit [Addendum at 5] and weigh the issue and the evidence against the position taken by 
5
 which issues are pending appeal before this court in case number 20080838-CA 
6
 [R. 2963] 
3 
n 
Golden Meadows and the 12 denials by Judge Dawson in the form of: I do not recall, I 
have no memory and I have no prior knowledge. 
IV. GOLDEN MEADOWS STRATEGY IS AS OBVIOUS AS IT IS IMPROPER 
The basic issues before this Court, in this appeal, deal with fundamental fairness in 
court procedure and maintaining a level playing field for all parties. The legal strategy 
and arguments presented by opposing counsel ie: attorneys James Swindler and Wayne 
Petty, require this Court to interpret the four corners of the Notice to Quit that governs 
this action [Addendum at 5] and determine whether or not Nupetco and the furniture, 
furnishings and personal property had any role in this litigation which would permit 
discovery (See Appellants Opening Brief at pgs 20-21 at ff's 16-20). 
When Petty and Swindler are not obfuscating the true facts of this case or 
ferociously attacking the nature of Strand and Allen's character with false representations 
and disingenuous comments, they utilize the client of record (Golden Meadows) to 
litigate the claims of Neuman Petty and Nupetco and then, through the use of date of its 
formation (1995), this inanimate corporate identity is used to impede the Appellants 
discovery and preclude them from rebuttal. Golden Meadows sole member and manager 
is Nupetco thus depriving the Appellants from discovering the knowledge that is imputed 
to it from its agents in this case ie: Neuman Petty, Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty ie: 
members and managers of Nupetco. This vicious circle and seamy strategy is clearly in 
In contradiction to the Notice to Quit [Addendum at 5], their objection to the Appellants 
Motion to Stay [R. 2335], and Neuman Petty's May 19, 1989 Affidavit [R. 2987], which 
relies on the 1985 lease and states that on April 18, 1989 the IRS executed a levy on 
property located at 1199 South 1500 East and removed the fixtures attached to the 
residence and the furniture located in said property [R. 2995]. 
4 
violation of the law and Rule 3.1 through 3.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
and should not be tolerated. Golden Meadows reliance on judicial estoppel against 
Strand in the face of the 1989 IRS seizure, Neuman Petty's May 19, 1989 Affidavit and 
the subsequent payment by Strand to the IRS, fails as a matter of law. It is a clear and 
desperate attempt to obfuscate and confuse the issues and Golden Meadows has not and 
cannot establish the required elements set forth in Orvis v. Johnson 111 P. 3d 600 (Utah 
2008). 
The Summary Judgment ruling on appeal that is designated as case no. 20080838-
CA was in error and contrary to law. Strand's claims and defenses were not precluded by 
the Statute of Limitations9. The entry of Summary Judgment against him was 
inappropriate and due process requires that Strand be afforded a fair trial in a fair tribunal. 
Golden Meadows arguments with respect to the Appellants Rule 60(b) Motion, the 
Motion to Quash or Stay Execution of Judgment and the Property Bond are unpersuasive, 
are not supported by the record and, do not require any response except to bring to this 
Court's attention that Golden Meadows challenges to the issues pending appeal and its 
statements of fact are unsupported with no foundation and no evidence. Golden 
Meadows inappropriately attributes most of its claims in reliance on speculation about 
Neuman Petty and or Nupetco's alleged positions or claims. Such behavior has been the 
case throughout these proceedings which has resulted in the Appellants (i) being 
8
 A corporations' knowledge is entirely imputed to it from the knowledge possessed by its 
officers and agents. Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P. 3d 1009 (Utah 
2002). 
9
 Bangerter v. Petty 2009 UT 67 (2009). 
5 
sanctioned for attempting to discover information about the claims asserted for Neuman 
Petty and or Nupetco by Golden Meadows (ii) the Appellants rebuttal testimony being 
stricken [R. 1319 and 2213] and (iii) Strand being inappropriately evicted from his home 
of 32 years on Summary Judgment Motion, in spite of his trust claims [R. 45 f 19, 46 f 30, 
47134,46131 and 2702]. 
According to the facts of the 1989 IRS collection action against Strand, and, 
consistent with Strands claims, Strand is the owner of the property that is the subject 
matter of this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Dawson was not qualified to act on this case. For the reasons stated above 
and by the Appellants in their Opening Brief, the Appellants respectfully request this 
Court to require Judge Dawson's immediate recusal and vacate his orders as proscribed 
by the Cannons of Judicial Conduct and the United Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health 
Servs. Acquisition Corp. U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2197 (1988). 
Respectfully Submitted this<35. day of January, 2010. 
^7^S^C^L>- o -
Michael Strand 
Cari Allen 
6 
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Westlaw. 
696 P.2d 1219 
(Cite as: 696 P.2d 1219) 
c 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sarah Ann ANDERSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, De-
partment of Employment Security, Barco of Utah, 
State Insurance Fund, and Second Injury Fund, De-
fendants. 
No. 19128. 
Feb. 15, 1985. 
On review of worker's compensation order, the Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that claimant was 
denied due process by issuance of reaffirmance or-
der by administrative law judge who was counsel 
for second injury fund when case was argued before 
judge who subsequently retired. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Constitutional Law 92 €=^4186 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)7 Labor, Employment, and 
Public Officials 
92k4186 k. Workers' Compensation 
and Employers' Liability. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k301(4)) 
Worker's compensation applicant was denied due 
process by issuance of order, which reaffirmed re-
tired judge's order, by administrative law judge who 
was formerly counsel for second injury fund when 
case was argued before judge who subsequently re-
tired. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-82.53, 78-7-1(3); U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[2J Constitutional Law 92 €^>3955 
Page 1 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(E) Civil Actions and Proceedings 
92k3955 k. Bias and Prejudice in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k305(l)) 
One fundamental principle of due process is that all 
parties to case are entitled to unbiased, impartial 
judge. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[3] Judges 227 €>^>39 
227 Judges 
227IV Disqualification to Act 
227k39 k. Nature and Effect in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Fairness requires not only absence of actual bias of 
judge, but endeavors to prevent even possibility of 
unfairness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^> 
314 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(A) In General 
15Ak314 k. Bias, Prejudice or Other Dis-
qualification to Exercise Powers. Most Cited Cases 
Principle that all parties to case are entitled to un-
biased, impartial judge, applies with as much force 
to administrative proceedings as it does to judicial 
trials. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^> 
314 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(A) In General 
15Ak314 k. Bias, Prejudice or Other Dis-
qualification to Exercise Powers. Most Cited Cases 
Although statute which requires trial judge to dis-
qualify himself if he has previously appeared as at-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
696 P.2d 1219 
(Cite as: 696 P.2d 1219) 
Page 2 
torney in case does not literally apply to adminis-
trative proceedings, principle it embodies is useful 
and persuasive guide in reviewing administrative 
proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 78-7-1(3). 
[6] Judges 227 €>=>47(1) 
227 Judges 
227IV Disqualification to Act 
227k47 Acting as Counsel or Other Participa-
tion in Cause 
227k47(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Actual prejudice need not be shown where judge 
has previously been involved in case as attorney, 
since law presumes prejudice in such circum-
stances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
*1220 Thorn D. Roberts, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Frank V. Nelson, James R. Black, Gilbert A. Mar-
tinez, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
In 1978 the plaintiff, Sarah Anderson, injured her 
knee while working for Barco of Utah, a defendant. 
The injury necessitated a knee operation, and 
plaintiff applied to the Industrial Commission for 
worker's compensation benefits. Barco's insurer, the 
State Insurance Fund, settled with appellant. 
After the operation, plaintiffs knee did not heal and 
she missed several months of work. A degenerative 
condition in her knee caused it to deteriorate, ne-
cessitating two more operations. In 1980 she ap-
plied to the Industrial Commission for additional 
compensation. A medical panel found a 17.5% per-
manent partial physical impairment, which was 
caused partly by the industrial accident, and partly 
by a pre-existing degenerative knee condition. The 
panel further found that after the first knee surgery, 
plaintiffs knee condition should have stabilized in 
three months, and that any temporary total disabil-
ity after three months was due to the pre-existing 
degenerative knee condition. The administrative 
law judge, Judge Foley, adopted the medical panel's 
findings, and ordered compensation for thirteen 
weeks for temporary total disability and found a 
17.5% permanent partial disability. 
The plaintiff objected to the findings as erroneous, 
and Judge Foley granted a further hearing as al-
lowed by statute. U.C.A., 1953, section 35-1-82.53 
(Supp.1983). At the hearing, the plaintiff adduced 
the testimony of her personal physician, Dr. Mc-
Queen. We are unable to review this testimony be-
cause the transcript of that hearing has been lost. 
The plaintiff asserts that Dr. McQueen testified that 
the medical panel set plaintiffs permanent partial 
impairment rating too low and improperly based its 
finding of the time required for stabilization on nor-
mal recovery rates. 
Section 35-1-82.53 provides that when a case is re-
opened and a further hearing held, the administrat-
ive law judge will enter a supplemental order. 
However, after the second hearing Judge Foley 
neither reaffirmed nor modified his previous find-
ings and order, nor did he enter a supplemental or-
der, although counsel for plaintiff requested him to 
do so. 
*1221 Judge Foley retired in July or August, 1982, 
and was succeeded by Mr. Timothy Allen, who had 
been counsel for the Second Injury Fund when this 
case was argued before Judge Foley. In January, 
1983, Judge Allen issued an order reaffirming the 
previous order and dismissing plaintiffs objections 
to the court's findings. Plaintiff sought review by 
the Industrial Commission, which declined to hear 
the matter. 
We need not consider all plaintiffs arguments on 
appeal, since one is dispositive. 
[1][2][3] It was error for Judge Allen to preside in 
this case, since he was formerly an attorney for one 
of the parties. One of the fundamental principles of 
due process is that all parties to a case are entitled 
to an unbiased, impartial judge. "A fair trial in a 
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
696 P.2d 1219 
(Cite as: 696 P.2d 1219) 
Page 3 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 
625, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955). Fairness requires not 
only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to 
prevent even the possibility of unfairness. 
[4][5] This principle applies with as much force to 
administrative proceedings as it does to judicial tri-
als. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 
1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973); Vali Convales-
cent & Care Institution v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (1982). Utah law requires a 
trial judge to disqualify himself if he has previously 
appeared as an attorney in the case. U.C.A., 1953, 
section 78-7-1(3). Although this statute does not lit-
erally apply to administrative proceedings, the prin-
ciple it embodies is a useful and persuasive guide in 
reviewing administrative proceedings. See 3 K. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise section 196 (2d 
ed. 1980). 
In Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C.Cir.1962), the 
court held that an SEC commissioner should not 
have participated in revocation proceedings, since 
he formerly had been responsible for initiating and 
conducting the investigation of the company sub-
ject to revocation. The court stated: " 'The funda-
mental requirements of fairness in the performance 
of [quasi-judicial] functions require at least that one 
who participates in a case on behalf of any party ... 
take no part in the decision of that case by any 
tribunal on which he may thereafter sit.' " Id. at 264 
{quoting Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C.Cir.1958)). 
[6] In other words, when a judge has previously 
been involved in a case as an attorney, there is no 
need to show actual prejudice. The law presumes 
prejudice in such circumstances. Judge Allen 
should have disqualified himself in this case. 
The defendants acknowledge that Judge Allen 
should not have acted in this case, but argue that 
the error was harmless because it did not affect the 
outcome in the case. Specifically, they argue that 
Judge Allen's written order merely memorializes 
what Judge Foley had already decided at the close 
of the second hearing. They assert that Judge Foley 
ruled from the bench that the plaintiffs objections 
were dismissed and that the medical panel's find-
ings would not be modified. 
The record does not support the defendants' factual 
assertions. As noted earlier, the transcript of the 
second hearing was lost, and hence the record does 
not reflect what Judge Foley said at the close of the 
second hearing. Although Judge Allen's order states 
that "it appears from the file that [plaintiffs] coun-
sel was advised ... at the termination of the hearing" 
that his objections were dismissed, we find nothing 
in the record to support this statement. 
We therefore set aside the Commission's order and 
remand this case for submission of the issue to an-
other administrative law judge. 
Reversed and remanded. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, HOWE and ZIM-
MERMAN, J J., concur. 
Utah, 1985. 
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah 
696 P.2d 1219 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. Note History 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
NOTICE TO QUIT 
To: Michael Strand, Cari Allen and All Occupants of the Property 
Date: August 23,2007 
Re: Residence and Lot Located at 1199 S. 1500 E., Bountiful, UT (the "Property") 
The undersigned represents Golden Meadows Properties, L.C. ("Golden Meadows"), the 
owner of the Property described above. 
You are tenants at will occupying the Property at the pleasure of Golden Meadows. 
Notice is hereby given that you are required to surrender and quit the Property, including 
the removal of all your belongings therefrom (but none of the furniture, furnishings and personal 
property belonging to Nupetco Associates) within five (5) calendar days after service of this 
Notice on you. If you fail to do so, you will be in unlawful detainer of the Property and will be 
liable for three times the damages caused thereby, including the fair rental value of the Property 
from and after the expiration of such five-day period. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
James C. Swindler 
Attorney for Golden Meadows Properties, L.C. 
175 E. 400 S., Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801-524-1000 
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The C i t i z e n s Bank ' K ' S: ^ so ""CTO> 
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285 West North Temple
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ft, 
3648941 TRUST DEED * 
wiUi/lX
 W i t h Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this day of £ 5 k ? S « Y ^
 2 9 82. 
between B. . . . .X*. -^sjociates^^ 
. ? S S E g £ ? t i o 5 , as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 
(Stract *»d sanlwr) (City) (StftU) 
The C i t i z e n s Bank 
as TRUSTEE,' and 
The Citizens Bank 
.., as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in . . .Salt.JLake..County, 
County, State of Utah, including, but not limited to, a lease hold interest 
therein granted by Salt Lake City Corporation to Seigel Mobile Home 
Group, Inc. and thereafter assigned to Trustor: 
Beginning at a point 1924.53 feet mure or less, 
North 0°02,38n East and 436 feet more or less, 
South 89°57,22" East from the South quarter 
r. c, corner of Section 33, T. IN., R. 1 W., Salt 
% ^ Lake Base and Meridian, said point further 
described as being station 61+83-00 North and 
'8+51.00 West on the Airport Grid System (A.G.S.) 
Eastside; and running thence North 0°02'38w East 
r^ 88.0 feet, thence South 89°57t22M East 60.0 
feet, thence South 0°02,38" West 88.0 feet; 
thence North 89657,22w West 60.0 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Contains 5,280 square feet, or 0.12 acres, more 
or less. 
3 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of g 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances £L 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, ¥1 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Jj£ 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; '^5 
FOR THE PURPOSEOF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro- $g 
mtssory note ^ t t X R x t ^ i ^ K & x mine principal sum of $.3 9Q. f.O.P 0 , 0 0
 t made by ** ^ 
•RowrteR payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of QQ 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as CD 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provi ded. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah Slate Etar; a bank, building and Joan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Uiah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorised to do such business in Utah. 
«n iruswr. u w i »CJI M U proper*./, on *•"* o n e ana »i ine time ana place designated m wnd notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shalt be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
ssje The person conducting the **1? xn*y. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by auch person at the time and place last appointed for the sate; provided, if the sale is postponed 
lor longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
t . ^ . manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Iked of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary may bid at the male. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the coats and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale ana of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the **lt took place. 
IS. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare ail sums 
secured hereby immediately due And payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on reai property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Bach such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, mnd notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
30. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
B. I . A s s o c i a t e s , Inc . 
By T^t^st c^^t^^y^ 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of _, AJD. 19 ., personally 
appeared before me ~ ^ , 
the tigner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ...lie.... executed ih^ 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF «*• 
On the 1.1 day of ISfeESfiSC , A.D. 19.LVpersona!Jy 
appeared before me .££*££££•&.—wJ>.2«£r*3& , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the U j W « i A W £ of . _ J . A M J . ^ . & s s p c i a t e s , . . . . I n c . , 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
.....^^..f.^.?;.i.S:T.rfr.T.X^.^ 
I J % jSfotary Public^ding at: 
My Commission Expires: fy/f/fj L^»f/u^ £$fir 
WHEN RECORDED, M A ^ O t ^ ^
 tf SECURITY TITLE COMPANY Cnaer NO Pfe£>77 Fee Paid-J& : 
iJ5JlgH.JMtH.XEMHi£ 
.S&ULiAKE .C. I TY.X.. UT/\H J L t l M Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
ATTN: L . S . LIVINGSTON ^ ^ 
TRUST' DEED 
605336 _,. , . .
 l o , 
With. Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...4.£.h dry of 0.e.caO)bie.r. , 198.1... 
between ...MICHAEL..STRANO 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is . ...119.9. SAW.th-J5ClQ.JEft.St .. flAimfcifui..... JltAb 
• Jrfr-** t-vi mamta" (Cilyi (StuU) 
I i E . . . ? m ? . ^ § 3*NiC. _ , as TRUSTEE,* and 
.IM.CITUENSJAHK , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in ... QMIS 
County, State of Utah: 
All of Lot 203, CANYON CREST PLAT NUMBER l,9-" , a subdivision of 
part of Section 28, Township 2 North, Range 1 -ast, Salt Lake 
Meridian, in the City of Bountiful» according to the official 
plat thereof. 
/ 
ZL 
£ 
o 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, right3 o. 
way,-.easements* rents, issues,.prorits, income, tenements,, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging,- now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property» or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of-the indebtedness, evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the.principal,aum of ^SJ^LaJEUUUfifi. , made by 
Trustor,payable to the order'of Beneficiary at"the times, in the-maiuier and with interest as therein 
set forth, arid-any extensions-and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance, of 
each agreement:of Trustor herein contained;- (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances aa 
hereafter, may.-be. made to-Trustor, or his successors- or assigns, when evidenced by-a promissory 
note or notes, reciting, that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4)-the.*payment o^all sums 
expended or 'advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof' together with interest 
thereon as-herein provlc led. 
"NOTKr Trottee-moatbe a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, buildms and loan association, or-savings 
and loan aasodatlon authorised to do such business in. Utah: a corporation authorized to do a trust busbies* in 
Utah: or a tiUe insurance or abstract company authorised to do such buames* in Utah, 
